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Resumo  
O presente trabalho examina a questão dos incidentes de cibersegurança. 
Mais especificamente, este trabalho examina se existe relação e em caso de 
existir, avalia como é que, de facto, os incidentes de cibersegurança estão 
envolvidos com a quantidade de taxas de auditoria cobradas, assim como com 
algumas características específicas dos auditores externos. Os resultados da 
análise permitem demonstrar que existe uma relação positiva e significativa 
entre a alteração nas taxas de auditoria no ano da violação dos dados. Os. 
auditores aumentam as taxas de auditoria com o objectivo de reduzir o risco de 
auditoria associado aos incidentes e eventos de cibersegurança, bem como nos 
esforços adicionais para avaliar a empresa afectada. 
Além disso, o aumento nas taxas de auditoria cobradas é confirmado não só 
através do ano em que ocorreu o evento, mas também nos 2 anos seguintes, 
aquando da existência de uma mudança de auditor. 
 
 
Keywords: Riscos de cibersegurança, quebras, auditores externos, taxas de 
auditoria, especialista da indústria, mudança de auditor. 
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Abstract 
The present work examines whether and how the cybersecurity incidents are 
related to the amount of audit fees as well as to some specific characteristics of 
external auditors. Results of the analysis allow to demonstrate that there is a 
positive and significant relation between the change in audit fees in the year of 
the data breach. Auditors increase the audit fees to reduce the audit risk 
associated with the cybersecurity incidents, as well as for the additional efforts 
to evaluate the breached company. 
Moreover, the increase in audit fees is confirmed not only in the year of the 
event but also for the following two years when there is a change in auditor. 
 
 
Keywords: Cybersecurity risks, breaches, external auditors, audit fees, 
industry specialist, auditor’s change. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Given the globalization phenomena, all the companies around the world are 
becoming every day more dependent from technology. According to SEC 
(2018), today the importance of data management and technology to business is 
analogous to the importance of electricity and other forms of power in the past 
century.  
Turning all systems and operations connected, firms store data online and 
share information with different stakeholders. Therefore, as a first consequence, 
companies need to protect their business from the cybersecurity attacks, 
causing an increase in the IT investments. From a shareholder point of view, it 
is necessary to know how resources are allocated and whether there are any 
variations of IT investments pre- or post- a data breach (SEC, 2018). 
Cybersecurity turned out as an issue with increasingly importance in the 
markets and economies nowadays that it might cause reduction of stock price 
as well as it might have a negative effect on the value of the companies. 
In this context the external auditors play an important role given that they 
should guarantee that the financial statements report all facts that affect the 
company performance and might reduce the value of their assets. By analysing 
the financial reports, they should verify that the cybersecurity investments 
made before and after a data breach inform properly the investors (Rosati, 
Gogolin, and Lynn, 2017). 
The main purpose of the thesis is to examine whether and how incidents are 
related to the amount of audit fees as well as to some specific characteristics of 
external auditors as well as how the cybersecurity risk factors are disclosed by 
the companies. Therefore, after a first examination of the concept of 
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cybersecurity, risks and incidents related to cybersecurity breaches will be 
examined. 
Besides that, it will be investigated if the audit fees are related to a several 
characteristics like the audit effort that an auditor should present (Choi et al., 
2008) or the business risk that will have impact on the audit fees (Bell, 
Landsman, & Shackelford, 2001) and if there are any increase/decrease of audit 
fees pre-post breaches. Moreover, it will be examined if the presence of Industry 
Specialist or the Change in Auditor can explain an increase in audit fees after 
the cybersecurity breaches. 
Thus, for these reasons, both Regulations from SEC (2011; 2018) in force in 
USA and Europe are examined in order to highlight the requirements, 
differences and consequences on company’s disclosure. This comparison allows 
bettering understanding how companies behave and manage the cybersecurity 
incidents in different ways whether faced with different legislation. 
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2. Literature Review 
2.1. Definition and Classification of 
Cybersecurity Incidents 
 Modern economies are based on the security and trust of communication 
channels, as well as, on the transactions of information through sophisticated 
systems and networks. For these reasons, the Security Exchange Commission 
has recently underlined that “with the rise of digital communication, 
cybersecurity represents risks and threats to the capital markets. Therefore, 
cybersecurity risks and their risk factors, more than spoil industries, companies 
and investors from all countries, they can affect financial statements and annual 
reports” (SEC, 2018).  
According to National Initiative for Cybersecurity Workforce Framework,  
cybersecurity is defined as “the activity or process, ability or capability, or state 
whereby information and communications systems and the information 
contained therein are protected from and/or defended against damage, 
unauthorized use or modification, or exploitation” (DHS, 2014). Therefore, one 
of the main goals to a company is to reduce the threats of cyberattacks and 
vulnerability by improving the information assurance.  
The relevance of the phenomenon has been justified by a fast growing in 
number of studies that focus on cybersecurity issues. Gordon, Loeb, and Zhou 
(2011) define a cybersecurity incident as “a security breach or any events which 
compromises the availability, confidentiality or integrity of an information 
asset”. Every day, companies are affected by several and different types of 
cybersecurity incidents such as malware, ransomware (or denial-of-service 
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attacks), malicious insiders, card payment fraud or human error1. Usually the 
main targets of the cybersecurity attacks are companies that detain critical data 
but also weak systems that facilitate its extortion. Recently, the Federal Bureau 
of Investigation (2018) reported that there is a fastest growing malwares (with 
more than 4,000 attacks since January 1 in 2016) that targeted all types of 
companies from different industries. For example, A.P. Moller-Maersk, a 
shipping company based in Copenhagen which transports about one-fifth of 
the world’s cargo, was recently victim of a ransomware shakedown with the 
name of NotPetya. Its terminals’ operations were impacted in four different 
countries causing expenses estimated more than 200 million dollars (Mathews, 
2017).  
One of the most critical factors for the companies is the short-term evaluation 
of a cybersecurity risks as well as its consequences when an incident occurs. For 
example, in markets with a growing number of M&As, cybercriminals tend to 
access into the smaller companies’ IT systems (PwC, 2016) with the negative 
effects in term of damage of their intangible assets. 
The 2017 Global Risks Report, released by World Economic Forum, 
underlines that the interdependence among different infrastructure networks is 
increasing the risk for systemic failures. Based on the latter report, USA is 
ranked top 7 in the ranking for cyberattacks, data fraud or theft, misuse of 
technologies. In Germany the situation is similar with data fraud or theft 
ranked in the first position and cyberattacks classified in the 6th position for 
risk (in Portugal, data fraud or theft and cyberattacks is in the 13th position).  
Moreover, there are several ways that the companies can use to protect 
themselves against the cyberattacks, such as the use of Cloud based, Big Data 
                                               
1 Appendix A reports a list of the different types of cybersecurity incidents described in this 
study followed by an example for each type of breach. For instance, ransomware is a format of 
malware where act most of the times through a spread of phishing emails. 
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Analytics, Advanced authentication, DevOps, Internet of Things (IoT) and other 
cybersecurity insurances, even if many times the investments in these assets are 
not effective.                                      
 
2.2 USA and EU regulation on data protection 
and cybersecurity 
As recently underlined by a PwC’s report (2016), even if the digitalization of 
business operations and the massive use of data analytics take many benefits to 
the companies, at the same time expose them to high cybersecurity risks. 
A study published by the Ponemon Institute (2017) highlights that 25 percent 
of the data breaches incidents in 2016 (based on a sample of 419 companies in 13 
countries and regions) were caused by the negligent employees or other human 
factors like contractors. 
For these reasons, both USA and European Union issued some important 
regulations to protect personal data of both consumers and investors. Recently, 
the EU issued the Data Protection Directive later substituted by General Data 
Protection Regulation (GDPR), Electronic Commerce Directive, and Copyrights 
in the Information Society Directive 2 , while USA’s federal agencies and 
regulators issued a legislation to protect the national critical infrastructures 
through SEC, PCAOB and other institutions. In this context, the online privacy 
still remains a grey area that is not full regulated and that leaves space to 
cybersecurity initiatives (Almeida, 2016).  
                                               
2  More than the Directives presented, European Union has issued documents such as 
Cybersecurity Strategy for the European Union, European Agenda on Security, Digital Single 
Market Strategy, Digitising European Industry and Network and Information Security 
Directive.  
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The approach followed by EU on this matter, it has been disclosed in specific 
guidelines on Cybersecurity Strategy document3 and Code of Online Rights4 that 
highlight how, according to the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), 
cybersecurity and privacy rights5 must be balanced into controls of IT systems.   
Also the USA Government issued some new rules to guarantee the 
protection of online privacy although there are still some difficulties to define a 
global strategy that align both USA and EU approaches6.  
Both Countries underline the importance to use Open Sources Platforms that 
are considered sustainable platforms which detect faster the vulnerabilities and 
threats of a huge volume of data, in order to improve efficiency and security. 
While EU defined an Open Source Strategy by improving ICT security through 
“state-of-art” 7 , USA Government provides a free and open source software 
named “FOSS”8 with the same level of preference attributed to proprietary 
software.  
However, EU and USA are still distant to have a common approach on 
cybersecurity and data protection, in fact, while the EU approach is based on 
standardization, the USA approach is based on the information exchange 
instead of source code access. The EU approach on the cybersecurity problem is 
                                               
3  http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/news/eu-cybersecurity-plan-prot-ect-open-internet-
and-online-freedom-and-opportunity-cyber-security, Action 28: Reinforced Network and 
Information Security Policy. 
4 http://ec.europa.eu/digital-agenda/en/code-eu-online-rights, Chapter 4: Privacy, protection 
of personal data and security. 
5 Statement by the EU delegation at the Internet Governance Forum held in Istanbul, Turkey, 
in 2014. 
6 CJEU, 6 October 2015 decision – C-362/14, Cri 2016, pp. 22-28. 
7 The Commission should continue developing according to the OSS communities while 
implementing state-of-art government pratices: 
http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/informatics/oss_tech/strategy/strategy_en.htm   
8 The Department of Defense must use OSS in order to achieve effectively the missions, 
http://dodcio.defense.gov/Portals/0/Documents/FOSS/2009OSS.pdf.  
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based on a standard strategy to combat cyberattacks, creating platforms based 
on encryption patterns, removable storage, hard copy devices and smart grids. 
 
2.2.1. Public Company Cybersecurity Disclosure and 
Risk Factors in Annual Reports 
Prior studies highlight that investors evaluate the voluntary disclosure in a 
positive way both management forecast, reports, conference calls or press 
releases released by a company are considered valuable and credible 
information (Healy and Palepu, 2001).  
The first SEC Regulation (CF Disclosure Guidance: Topic n.2) issued in 
October 2011 was inspired by a similar approach, SEC issued “a set of 
principles to follow” more than mandatory rules.  The main purpose was to 
help managers, lawyers and auditors to evaluate both companies’ and 
cybersecurity’s risks caused by business operations allowing them to prepare 
an “accurate disclosure”. Basically, despite of not being mandatory, every 
company should have taken into account all financial and operational risks on a 
regular basis to inform if “there would be anything material to disclose that 
could have impact for investors. For instance, in 2011, a company might 
disclose a risk of occurring a cyberincident because it was considered as a 
significant factor to make an investment speculative or risky” (SEC, 2011). 
As reported by the Guideline (2011) “although no existing disclosure 
requirement explicitly refers to cybersecurity risks and cyber incidents, a 
number of disclosure requirements impose an obligation on registrants to 
disclose such risks and incidents”. Therefore, in this sense the disclosure of 
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these risk factors should be considered a “mandatory disclosure”9. According to 
this Guideline (2011), every disclosure of cybersecurity risks must specify the 
nature and details of material risks and not being a generic disclosure. 
Therefore, a material disclosure should include: 
- Cybersecurity risks, potential costs or consequences caused by business 
or operations aspects; 
- Description and addressing of material cybersecurity risks when are 
presented as outsourced functions; 
- Description of the costs and consequences when describing a cyber 
incident; 
- Undetected incident risks; 
- Insurance protection and coverage’s description. 
 
After the issue of this document, companies had the advantage to better 
explore and evaluate their risk factors related to cyber risks in advance and to 
predict future incidents, threats and potential expenses. In 2011, in most of the 
data breaches incidents, customer data were compromised by a malware 
embedded in the company’s networks systems and even if this was not 
consider relevant to be disclosed, at the same time the negative event was 
evaluated and actions were taken to avoid  other unexpected expenses (SEC, 
2011).  
From an external point of view, it is important to clearly understand the 
exact time when a breach occurred and when, instead, this information has 
been released given that this could be strictly related to the presence of pending 
and legal proceedings.  
                                               
9 Every company should have followed the requirements established in the Regulation S-K 
Item 503 (c). 
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Furthermore, the 2011 Guideline defined the companies’ disclosure controls 
and subsequent procedures: companies need to elaborate an effective disclosure 
about their controls and procedures related to their businesses’ operations. The 
process involves four steps: i) the record, ii) the process, and iii) summary of the 
information.  
Afterwards the release of the 2011 Guidance, many companies followed the 
requirements, defined as “risk factors”. Willis North America’s report (2013) 
declares that nearly 88% of public companies included in Fortune 500 and 
nearly 78% of public companies included Fortune 501-1000 disclosed the 
cybersecurity risks factors in their annual reports. Similarly, another study 
(Audit Analytics, 2016) demonstrates that in 2015, more than 88% of Russell’s 
3000 companies released a disclosure about cybersecurity risks and over 2% of 
these companies reported that they experienced a cybersecurity incident. 
In 2018, SEC issued a new Regulation for all public companies, 
independently weather the company suffered or not a cyberattack, they have 
the “obligation to notify and inform their investors about both cybersecurity 
incidents, potential threats and all material cybersecurity risks in a reasonable 
time” (SEC, 2018). 
Compared to the 2011 Guidelines, the new Regulations 2018 presents some 
novelty: 
 the materiality of cybersecurity risks and the subsequent impacts have to 
be disclosed; 
 prohibition of insider trading; 
 the obligations are imposed by the exchange listing requirements10. For 
example, the NYSE listed requirements obligate companies to “release 
                                               
10 The requirement should be aligned with the Securities Act of 1993 (“Securities Act”) and 
the Security Exchange Act of 1934 (“Exchange Act”). Moreover, in case of dealing with periodic 
and current reports, they need to follow the Exchange Act (SEC, 2018). 
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quickly to the public any news of information which might reasonably be 
expected to materially affect the market for its securities” (NYSE, 2015). 
The NASDAQ’s rule 5250(b)(1), requires also that listed companies are 
have to “make prompt disclosure to the public of any material information 
that would reasonably be expected to affect the value of its securities or 
influence investors’ decisions”.  
 
Companies have to reveal a detailed disclosure that could compromise the 
cybersecurity defences, it is not supposed to give a “roadmap” to the flaws and 
entrances through specific and technical information of the systems and 
networks. However, companies need to disclose material cybersecurity risks 
including the consequences that could be financial, reputational or legal (SEC, 
2018). 
All public companies are required to follow the obligation to fill the 
requirements in form of: i) Periodic Reports, ii) Current Reports and iii) Security 
Act, and Exchange Act Obligations. The main contents that should be disclosed 
are the following:  
i) In the Periodic Reports companies have to provide timely and ongoing 
information about cybersecurity risks and incidents that trigger disclosure 
obligations” (SEC, 2018). The Periodic Report are those regular filled by 
the companies to disclose detailed information on regular basis, they 
include both the annual reports on Form 10-K11 and Form 10-Q. In the first 
one, companies have to disclose all business and operations, risk factors, 
proceedings, management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition 
and results of operations, financial statements, disclosure controls and 
procedures and corporate governance. The second one, includes quarterly 
                                               
11 17 CFR 249.310. 
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reports on Form 10-Q 12 , both in term of financial statements, 
management’s discussion and analysis of financial condition and results of 
operations and risk factors. For all private foreign companies, they need to 
fill the periodic reports on Form 20-F13. 
ii) Current Reports, both Form 8-K14and 6-K15, have report all the costs and 
consequences of material cybersecurity incidents.  
iii) The Securities Act and Exchange Act Obligations require that all public 
listed companies must reveal all material incidents in order to make a 
statement clear16 (SEC, 2018). 
 
By comparing the risk factors reported in the 2011 Guideline and in the new 
Regulation (SEC, 2018), the latter requires that companies disclosure the risk 
factors associated with investments and cybersecurity incidents, as defined in 
Item 503 (c)17 of Regulation S-K and Item 3.D18 of Form 20-F. In order to assess 
the risk factors, companies should report: 
- the severity and frequency of prior cybersecurity incidents; 
- the probability and magnitude of the cybersecurity incidents’; 
- the preventive actions that the company will take to prevent the 
incidents, included the relative costs; 
- aspects of business operations and associate costs and consequences of 
material risks; 
- the costs of protection and insurance coverage in a potential incident; 
                                               
12 17 CFR 249.308a. 
13 17 CFR 249.220f. 
14 17 CFR 249.308. 
15 17 CFR 249.306. 
16 Companies should take into consideration Sections 11, 12 and 17 of the Securities Act, as 
well as Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act. 
17 17 CFR 229.503(c). 
18 17 CFR 249.220f. 
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- the potential damage in reputation; 
- existing or pending potential laws as well as litigations that could affect 
the requirements and associated costs; 
- remediation, litigation, regulatory investigation costs related to  
cybersecurity incidents. 
 
Companies have to disclosure previous and ongoing cybersecurity incidents 
to communicate effectively these risks to investors. In a case of a data breach, a 
company should disclose it but also underline the reasons why the incident 
occurred and its consequences in term of business operations (SEC, 2018). 
Moreover, the company must provide information weather the cybersecurity 
material risks are related with products, services, competition or relationship 
with customer or suppliers.  
In relation to the legal proceedings (Item 103 of Regulation S-K prevails19) 
companies have to disclose any material information related to it, especially if it 
is related to customer information. In this case, the company must detail the 
litigation itself, the name of the court, the proceedings pending and so on and 
so forth (SEC, 2018). 
 
2.3 Strategies to contain cybersecurity risks 
Business executives and IT manages seek to improve the company 
performance by decreasing risk factors. The random acquisition of the IT tools 
cannot help to resolve all company cyber issues, smart organizations, instead, 
need to start a specific cybersecurity program to decrease risks of cybersecurity 
incidents. As report a recent study (PwC, 2016) companies can use specific tools 
                                               
19 17 CFR 229.103. 
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to decrease risk factors such as: i) Cloud Computing, ii) DevOps, iii) Internet of 
Things (IoT), iv) Big Data analytics and v) specific security framework, vi) 
advanced authentication and vii) cyber-insurance20. 
i) The usefulness of the cloud is related to the possibility to update 
intelligence gathering and threat modelling, block attacks more efficiently, 
highlight collective learning and increase the incident response.  These 
tools are considered efficient investments given that allow companies 
employees to manage the cybersecurity risk and to analyse huge volumes 
of data. For instance, Global Payments, a company based in Atlanta, 
allows payment technology services worldwide using private cloud 
managed services. These services allow to monitor threats and incident 
response by providing all alerts and threats and filter them to show which 
ones should be considered as a security threat or a false positive; 
ii) DevOps is a software development model which can promote a closer 
collaboration between IT operations and application developers. The 
software, used for example by Netflix, is an outstanding tool to reinforce 
the cybersecurity programs. Companies with thousands of active 
applications and with implementation of codes updates regularly, find the 
best use of this tool; 
iii) IoT, instead, is an ecosystem that consists in the devices internet 
connected and other operational tools. Despite of the advantages, 
companies are increasing the risk in security the data and the privacy. For 
these reasons, companies are also trying to figure it how common privacy 
and cybersecurity protocols can work together to protect their business’ 
operations. For example, Steelcase, a company that produce furniture in 
                                               
20 The Cloud Computing allows to interconnect the digital ecosystem between individuals, 
businesses and governments. This platform permits companies to connect through Cloud-Based 
Cybersecurity tools, including Big Data analytics and advanced authentication. 
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USA, uses an IoT accelerator called Seamless to better understand the 
technology behind the moving parts and the privacy requirements. 
iv) Furthermore, Big Data analytics is a model that monitors cybersecurity 
threats, implement an audit, review data and can respond to incidents in 
order to understand how and when it is used by whom. Besides of the 
software expertise, it is required an enormous commitment to computing 
resources. Big Data analytics can notice patterns that a company did not 
know that existed before, as well as to monitor and detect the employee’s 
behaviour for any suspicious activity.  
v) Risks based framework is a structure that allows to measure the yearly 
progress through a cybersecurity program that focuses on clients and on 
its information. For instance, the Canadian Imperial Bank of Commerce 
(CIBC) created a scorecard based on frameworks controls and it measures 
the maturity of the security program. 
vi) Moreover, advanced authentication is a tool used to reinforce the 
relationship between a customer and a business partner. Besides that, it 
can reinforce company’s security and stop any movement of fraud like 
payment card data, bad transactions like intellectual property and 
regulatory compliance like damage to the company itself (PwC, 2016). 
vii) Cybersecurity insurance appears is one of the ways that companies can 
follow to protect themselves from cybercriminals. Insurers assess the 
current capabilities and risks as a precondition to purchasing any policy. 
These estimations can help businesses to predict their legal and regulatory 
exposures, their costs of response and their potential brand damage 
related to the cybersecurity risks. However, nowadays, insurances 
products are mainly focused on data destruction, theft and extortion, 
denial of services attacks and cybersecurity audit expenses (PwC, 2017). 
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However, some studies demonstrate that in many occasions, the cybersecurity 
incidents are generally caused by vulnerabilities related to cybersecurity risks 
that increase with the use of the Internet, cloud computing, mobile devices and 
so on and so forth (Romanosky, Hoffman, & Acquisti, 2014; Abbasi, Sarker, & 
Chiang, 2016). The damages generated by the cybersecurity incidents depend 
on both the type of incident, industry, time period and firms’ visibility (Gordon, 
Loeb & Zhou, 2011) but also on the weakness and vulnerability of the 
information system of the company. 
 
Some “tangible” effects of the damage caused by the incidents are evident in 
terms of remediation costs, fines and reputation for the breached companies 
(Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004; Gordon, Loeb, & Zhou, 2011) with 
negative consequences in term of value of the company. In fact, prior researches 
highlighted that cybersecurity incidents can lead up to a five percent loss in the 
market value (Campbell et al., 2003; Garg, Curtis, & Halper, 2003). 
 
 
2.4. The role of Auditors in firm’s disclosure 
and risk assessment 
According to SEC (2011, 2018), principal executives and financial officers 
should follow specific requirements both in the quarterly and in the annual 
reports. Even if the evaluation of the cybersecurity risks and the existence and 
maintenance of efficient internal controls remain the responsibility of the 
company, both internal and external auditors play a critical role in 
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understanding how the business should use IT and their impact on the financial 
statements.  
One of the main issues related to the cybersecurity incidents is the 
identification of the exact time when the data breaches occurred. Several times, 
many customers records are stolen or lost, therefore the estimation of both the 
actual and future damages (expenses/provisions) for the company becomes 
really difficult (Rosati, Gogolin, and Lynn, 2017) both for internal managers and 
even more for the external auditors. Therefore, the cybersecurity incidents21 
(data breaches) represent large threats not only for the companies affected but 
as well as for the reputation of their auditors (CAQ, 2017).  
The Deloitte’s report (2017), “Cybersecurity and the role of internal audit”, 
underlines the relevance of the role of the internal auditors by providing an 
independent assessment of the controls and helping the board to understand 
the digital risks, in this sense they are fundamental to contain cyber threats.  
Generally, the internal auditors have to assess and identify all opportunities 
in order to improve the enterprise security and to inform the board and the 
auditee committee about the controls, the potential legal issues and financial 
liabilities. An internal audit plan for cybersecurity should be embraced but it 
requires a constant testing and an assessment of the risk (Deloitte, 2017). 
In the last decade, IT has been considered as a cornerstone for an effective 
internal control system and it represents an important part in financial 
reporting (Masli et al., 2010; Li, Sun, & Ettredge, 2010; Haislip et al., 2016) at the 
                                               
21 There many definition of cybersecurity incidents, among them: cyber-terrorism as defined as an act are committed to 
the use of technology, being defined as “the purposeful act or the threat of the act of violence to create fear and/or 
compliant behaviour in a victim and/or audience of the act or threat” (Stohl, 2007); hactivism: Explained as “the marriage 
of hacking with political activism” (Stohl, 2007); cyber-crime. instead as explained as “criminal offenses committed on-
line or through other forms of information technology” (Quigley et al., 2015); cyber-warfare as explained as “the role of 
information technology as an enabler of warfare” (Colarik & Janczewski, 2012). 
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same time it increases the vulnerability and the chance of cybersecurity 
incidents (Benaroch, Chernobai, & Goldstein, 2012).  
The external auditors are required to evaluate both the internal controls and 
the subsequent information of security management controls, therefore they are 
responsible for monitoring and testing the material risk through the assessment 
of controls and cybersecurity threats. As all the data breaches generate impact 
on financial reporting, the potential effects have direct impact also on the 
auditors’ careers.  The understanding of company’s internal control and IT 
systems and how they related to the financial reporting should be reported by 
the external auditors in their reports as well as the assessment of the risks of 
material misstatement of financial statements post a data breach event (PCAOB, 
2013). 
According to the Center for Audit Quality (ICFR), external auditors 
distinguish from internal auditors given that the first ones are responsible for 
materials reported in the financial statements and in the internal controls over 
financial reporting, by analysing and testing the audit risk model and the 
subsequent cybersecurity threats (Christopher, Sarens, & Leung, 2009).  
The process involves the measurement of the losses and other liabilities or 
claims associated with financial statements and with customers (Stefaniak, 
Houston, & Cornell, 2012; Kajüter, Klassmann, & Nienhaus, 2016). 
In general auditors play a fundamental role in assuring confidence in 
financial statements and capital markets since the Certified Public Accountants 
(CPAs) are viewed as trusted advisors. If a data breach occurs, the external 
auditor should first verify the financial statement level, by evaluating accounts 
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and disclosures, and then check the presence of material misstatement in the 
documents that the company released22. 
In the company’s evaluation post data breaches, auditor should consider that 
the negative effects of the incidents23  both in term of damages of the book value 
of equity the company and as market value. This means that a data breach 
generates expenses when it occurs. Usually, firms spend large amounts of 
money every year to prevent any damages, to protect and to secure the 
company from any breach, however, when a cyberattack occurs it is difficult to 
establish the exact value of the damage. 
There are two different types of costs related to the data breaches auditor 
should consider: direct costs and indirect costs. Direct costs are all remediation 
costs, legal fees, fines and lost transactions (Aral, Dellarocas, & Godes, 2013) 
and protection costs, which may include the costs of making organizational 
changes, developing additional personnel and protection technologies, training 
employees and engaging third party experts and consultants. The indirect costs 
are those which include a loss of present and future revenues as well as the 
deterioration of customer and partner trust (Aral, Dellarocas, & Godes, 2013; 
Charette, Adams, & White, 1997).  
As these costs are difficult to estimate, researchers use a proxy measure 
which is the stock price (Cavusoglu, Mishra, & Raghunathan, 2004). These types 
of costs represent for instance the reputational damage that adversely affects 
customer or investor confidence and damage to the company’s competitiveness, 
stock price and long term shareholder value.  
 
                                               
22  About the audit procedure about the assessment of the IT environment see PCAOB 
Auditing Standard No.16.  
23 A data breach could represent, for example, a theft or destruction of intellectual property, 
financial assets or other information sensitive to the company, shareholders and customers, SEC 
2018. 
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2.4.1 Auditors classification and changes in audit fees 
According to Krishnan & Visvanathan (2009), auditors charge audit fees to 
control risk and diminish the audit risk (Budescu, Peecher, & Solomon, 2012), 
concluding that auditors realize that inly accounting financial expertise 
contributes to an audit process’ effectiveness. Based on literature, audit fees 
analysed by many authors like Koh & Tong, 2013, are charged by auditors and 
lead in its turn to good internal controls (Benaroch, Chernobai, & Goldstein, 
2012; Masli et al., 2010; Li, Sun, & Ettredge, 2010; Haislip et al., 2016). 
There is a large body of literature that demonstrates that the level of audit 
fees should compensate the auditors for the services provided and at the same 
time should include the audit risk (Bell, Landsman & Shackelford, 2001; Frino, 
Palumbo, and Rosati, 2017). The audit service (and consequently the level of 
audit fees) includes both the risk of material misstatement, when financial 
statements are misstated before the audit evaluation, and the detection risk, that 
includes the risk that the auditor will not be able to identify the misstatement 
(Lobo & Zhao, 2013). 
 
2.4.1.1. Industry Specialist 
Prior studies investigate the role of the industry specialist what are auditors 
designated by firms and whose training and practice experience largely are in a 
particular industry (Solomon, Shields and Whittington, 1999). Given that the 
effectiveness and efficiency in the audit tasks are related to the auditor’s 
knowledge, the industry specialist has a fundamental role and could better 
evaluate the company risk and misstatements. 
Therefore, an auditor that is an industry specialist should be able to assess 
the cybersecurity risks if the company that is under evaluation operate in the 
same sector of “auditor specialization”. Within this process, the outcome should 
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not originate a reassessment of the audit risk (Rosati, Gogolin, and Lynn, 2017). 
The main idea followed by prior studies (Vonna Palmrose, 1986) is based on the 
fact that the audit size and knowledge should provide a better service and 
therefore industry specialist should charge higher fees. 
 
2.4.1.2. Change in Audit Fees 
First of all, audit fees represent the compensation that auditors get for the 
provision of the audit services, and they can be established based on audit 
effort, litigation risk and normal profits (Simunic, 1980; Choi et al., 2008). Audit 
fees represent the compensation for the auditing services determined by the 
amount of work that an auditor must perform and the audit risk (Pratt & Stice, 
1994; Bell, Landsman, & Shackelford, 2001), therefore they reflect the auditor’s 
economic costs and it changes depending on auditor’s size, company risk, 
complexity and other specific client characteristics (Johnstone & Bedard, 2003; 
Gul & Goodwin, 2010).  
Given that audit risk is a function of material misstatement and of the 
detection risk (Lobo & Zhao, 2013), a change in audit fees should be interpreted 
as a red flag of a change in the risk of the company. 
According to the literature, audit fees can change towards several different 
factors. They depend on company size (Simunic, 1980; Koh & Tong, 2013; 
Gietzmann & Pettinicchio, 2014; Han et al., 2016), financial condition (Stice, 
1991; Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995; Chang & Hwang, 2003; Desai Hogan, & 
Wilkings, 2006), auditee complexity (Craswell, Francis, & Taylor, 1995; Choi et 
al., 2008; Han et al., 2016), business risk (Bell, Landasman, & Shackelford, 2001; 
Koh & Tong, 2013), asset structure (Stice, 1991; Sundgren, 1998; Krishnan & 
Visvanathan 2009), earnings quality (Bartov, Gul & Tsui, 2000; Bedard & 
Johnstone, 2004; Abbott, Parker, & Peters, 2006; Dechow, Ge, & Schrand, 2010), 
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corporate governance (Chen et al., 2014; Srinidhi, Yan, & Tayi, 2015), and 
regulatory environment (Jaggi & Low, 2011; Su & Wu, 2017).  
Based on prior research, auditors respond to the increase of risk of material 
misstatement by increasing their audit effort. This will decrease the detection 
risk and as result audit fees will increase subsequently (Allen et al., 2006; 
Budescu, Peecher, & Solomon, 2012). Also, with an emerging IT functions in the 
labour markets, auditors presenting outstanding skills will conduct to stronger 
internal controls and that will decrease the auditors’ risk and audit fees (Chen 
et al., 2014). The assessment of the IT risk into the cybersecurity risk will 
increase higher fees to those clients who have more risk even when the incident 
has not occurred.  
 
3. Research Hypotheses 
The questions raised in the previous section, allow to formulate three 
hypotheses: H1, H2 and H3 about the relationship between cybersecurity 
incidents and audit fees.  
 
3.1. Cybersecurity breaches and changes in 
audit fees 
Following Rosati et al. (2017) and previous literature (Han et al., 2016), 
auditors should increase the level of audit fees (changes in audit fees represent 
a proxy of auditor’s behaviour) in the year surrounding the data breach given 
both the increase in audit risks as well as the increase in the efforts to evaluate 
the impact of the incident on the financial statements of the company. The first 
hypothesis is stated as follows: 
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Hypothesis 1: Cybersecurity incidents are positively associated with audit 
fees. 
 
3.2. Effects of changes in auditor and Industry 
specialist on Audit fees post- cybersecurity 
breaches  
Following the study of Vonna Palmrose (1986) the audit size and knowledge 
is related with the provision of a high quality service, therefore industry 
specialist should charge higher fees. Given the increase of the audit risk after 
the data breaches is expected to find an increase of fees in the year of the 
cybersecurity incident and in the following periods. The second hypothesis is 
stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 2: The changes in audit fees post-cyber security incidents are 
positively associated with the presence of an industry specialist.  
Prior literature (Francis, 1984; Palmrose, 1986; Simon and Francis, 1988) 
highlighted that with a new auditor engagement client companies tend to pay 
lower fees compared to those expected given the characteristics of the customer. 
The “fee cutting” has been demonstrated to be around 24% (Simon and 
Francis, 1988) and many times the fee reductions and auditor change is 
associated to a change in auditor quality which threatens auditor independence. 
Therefore following the prior literature is expected to find a decrease in audit 
fees in the year in which a new auditor has been hired but an increase of the 
fees after a data breach event. The third hypothesis is stated as follows: 
Hypothesis 3 The changes in audit fees post-cybersecurity incidents are 
positively associated with a change of auditor. 
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4. Methodology  
4.1 Sample selection 
Similarly, to Rosati (2017), we begin the construction of our sample by 
identifying all firms in the database Audit Analytics Audit Fees from the 2015 
to 2018. We applied a series of filters and eliminated all financial companies 
(with SIC Codes 6000-6999, since the different nature of their financial 
statements) firms which are not in Compustat, and firms with missing data.  
To identify the cybersecurity data breaches, Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 
(PRC) database 24  has been used. This database identifies trends in privacy 
protection and enunciates its findings to advocates, policymakers, industry, 
media and consumers25. Previous studies like Garrison & Ncube (2011), Higgs 
et al. (2016) and Rosati et al. (2017) have adopted this dataset given that this 
database reports information that is detailed regarding the cybersecurity 
incidents which have affected US citizens. According to Rosati et al. (2017), the 
disclosure requirements allow researchers to consider the disclosure date of a 
subsequent incident through a close approximation of the discovery date, 
meaning that it is worth nothing the situations where some security breaches 
may only be found and discovered towards a significant amount of time or in 
some situations where the exact time and the duration of the breach may not be 
determined. Despite of some corporate events like mergers and acquisitions or 
earnings announcement, it is complex and hard to put together an extent list of 
                                               
24  Due to the increase in disclosure requirements and in the fact that PRC reunites 
information from multiple different sources, this dataset it gathers 1026 cybersecurity incidents 
disclosed by firms, non-profit organizations, healthcare organizations and government agencies 
in the US from April 2005 to September 2018. 
25 PRC is a California based non-profit corporation. The website for detailed information on 
data breaches is available at http://www.privacyrights.org/data-breach.  
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cybersecurity breaches since “many organizations are not aware they have been 
breached or are not required to report it based on reporting laws” (PRC, 2017).  
In order to distinguish all the different types of cybersecurity incidents, the 
sample is not restricted to hacker attacks, meaning that the sample also includes 
other types of cybersecurity incidents (see Table 2 and Appendix A for more 
detailed information). As reported in Table 1, after matching with the Audit 
Analytics Fees and Compustat database, the final sample consists of 4,024 firms, 
167 breached firms and 3,857 non-breached firms. 
 
Table 1 
Sample selection 
 
This table summarizes the sample selection process. Number of firms deleted at each step in 
parenthesis. 
  
Data Source        Firms 
AuditAnalytics audit fees file (2015-2018) 12,923 
Less: 
     Financial Companies -2,249 
     Non-Compustat -5,456 
     Missing Data -1,194 
Final sample 4,024 
     Breached 167 
     Non-breached 3857 
 
 
4.2 A model to detect audit fees changes in the 
year of the data breaches 
Following prior studies (e.g. Han et al., 2016; Hogan & Wilkins, 2008) and in 
order to test the first hypothesis from Rosati, Gogolin, and Lynn (2017), it has 
been used the yearly audit fees as a proxy for auditor’s behaviour. Given that 
data are cross sectional and time-series in nature, according to the robust cluster 
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technique by Petersen (2009), the following regression model has been tested 
and controlled for heteroscedasticy and autocorrelation. 
 
Therefore, similarly to Rosati (2017) the following regression model has been 
tested to verify the hypothesis 1: 
LAFi,t = + BREACHi,t + LTAi,t +  LEVi,t +  CURi,t +  QUICKi,t +  
ROAi,t +  Log_DEBTEQi,t +  YEi,t +  BUSSEGi,t +  ICWEAKi,t +  Industry 
Indicators + Year Indicators +i,t         (1) 
 
Where: 
LAF= natural logarithm of audit fees; 
BREACH= 1 if a firm experiences a cybersecurity incident in the year t, 0 
otherwise; 
LTA= natural logarithm of end of year total assets; 
LEV= current liabilities divided by total assets; 
CUR= current assets divided by total assets; 
QUICK= difference between current assets and inventory divided by current 
liabilities; 
ROA= net income (loss) divided by total assets; 
Log_DEBTEQ= total debt divided by equity book value; 
YE= 1 if a firm’s fiscal year does not end on December 31, 0 otherwise; 
BUSSEG= natural logarithm of the number of business segments in which a 
firm operates; 
ICWEAK= 1 if a firm’s internal controls were not found to be effective under 
Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 0 otherwise; 
Year Indicators= year indicators; 
Industry Indicators= industry indicators based on two-digit SIC codes; 
error term. 
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Following the proxy model by Rosati, Gogolin, and Lynn (2017) and in order 
to be consistent with prior studies like Gul & Goodwin (2010), the first 
hypothesis represents a regression which includes controls variables for all the 
factors. First, in terms of firm size (LTA), there is a control for the audit effort. 
Second, the number of the business segments (BUSSEG) controls the firms’ 
complexity. Third, there is an inclusion of the quick ratio (QUICK) and the ratio 
of current assets to total assets (CUR), in order to control for audit inherent risk. 
There are other factors which usually affect audit risk like firm’s profitability 
(ROA), leverage (LEV), logarithm of debt-to-equity ratio (Log_DEBTEQ) and 
internal control weaknesses (ICWEAK). Last but not least, in this model it is 
included control variables for off-peak fiscal year-end (YE). 
 
Furthermore, the first regression model in this paper goes forward from the 
studies presented in the paper of Rosati, Gogolin, and Lynn (2017), once new 
control variables have been included: Big4, Industry Specialist and Auditor 
Change. These three new variables have been integrated in the first regression 
model as well as in the following to test the hypothesis H2 and H3. 
According to previous studies, the dummy Big4 assume value 1 if the auditor 
is a Big4 company, 0 otherwise, allowing to control for higher audit quality 
(Eshleman & Guo, 2014), more strictly control (Krishnan, Rama, & Zhang, 2008; 
De Franco et al., 2011), and also because Big4 auditors are able to charge higher 
fees to their clients (Choi et al., 2008) than non-Big4 auditors. For that reasons, 
the first regression includes the variable Big4 to ensure homogeneity in terms of 
audit quality (Blankley, Hurtt, & MacGegor, 2012). On the other hand, the 
variable Auditor Change represents the turnover within the companies’ auditor 
after having a data breach. In this case, turns up to be interesting to study the 
relationship between audit fees and auditor change. The dummy variable 
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Industry Specialist supports the idea of an auditor being a market specialist 
(dummy=1) or not (dummy=0). Through the years and activities, this variable 
has been calculated considering the market share of the full sample of auditors 
included in Audit Analytics. 
 
Moreover, each type of incident has been classified according with PRC: a 
Payment Card Fraud (CARD) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 
cybersecurity incident was due to payment card fraud and 0 otherwise; 
Unintended Disclosure (DISC) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 
cybersecurity incident was due to unintended disclosure and 0 otherwise; 
Hacking or Malware (HACK) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 
cybersecurity incident was due to a malicious outsider attack and 0 otherwise; 
Insider (INSD) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a cybersecurity incident was 
due to malicious insider(s) and 0 otherwise; Physical Loss (PHYS) is an 
indicator variable equal to 1 if a cybersecurity incident was due to unauthorized 
physical access and 0 otherwise; Portable Device (PORT) is an indicator variable 
equal to 1 if a cybersecurity incident was due to stolen or lost portable device(s) 
and 0 otherwise; Stationary Device (STAT) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a 
cybersecurity incident was due to stationary device(s) and 0 otherwise; and 
Unknown (UNKN) is an indicator variable equal to 1 if a cybersecurity incident 
was due to an unknown cause and 0 otherwise.  
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Thereby for the H2, the regression model is: 
LAFi,t = + BIGi,t + INDUSTRY_SPECIALISTi,tPOSTi,tLTAi,t + 
 LEVi,t +  CURi,t +  QUICKi,t +  ROAi,t +  Log_DEBTEQi,t +  YEi,t + 
 BUSSEGi,t +  ICWEAKi,t +  Industry Indicators + Year Indicators +i,t         
(2) 
 
Where: 
LAF= natural logarithm of audit fees; 
BIG= 1 if an auditor’s company is a Big4 in the year t, 0 otherwise; 
INDUSTRY_SPECIALIST= 1 if an auditor’s company is an Industry Specialist 
in the year t, 0 otherwise; 
POST= 1 if a fiscal year is after a cyber security incident, 0 otherwise; 
All the variables are defined as in the equation 1). 
 
An extension of this model (2) includes the interaction term between the 
variable INDUSTRY_SPECIALISTi,t x POSTi,t,  and allows to verify the impact of 
the Industry Specialist in the year and after the data breaches events. 
  
In order to test the H3, the following regression model has been estimated: 
LAFi,t = + BIGi,t + AUDITOR_CHANGEi,tPOSTi,tLTAi,t +  
LEVi,t +  CURi,t +  QUICKi,t +  ROAi,t +  Log_DEBTEQi,t +  YEi,t +  
BUSSEGi,t +  ICWEAKi,t +  Industry Indicators + Year Indicators +i,t         (3) 
 
Where: 
AUDITOR_CHANGE= 1 if an auditor’s company changes when a data breach 
occurs in the year t, 0 otherwise; 
All the variables are defined as in the equation 1) and 2). 
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An extension of this model (3) includes the interaction term between the 
variable AUDITOR_CHANGEi,t x POSTi,t,  and allows to verify the impact of the 
Auditor Change in the year and after the data breaches events. 
In order to test both the hypotheses 2 and 3, a sample that includes only the 
breached companies has been used. Moreover, all models 1,2,3 have been 
controlled for both Tolerance test, Variance inflation factor and 
Multicollinearity using variance inflation factors. 
 
5. Analysis and discussion of empirical 
results 
5.1 Descriptive statistics and Results 
Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics in three different panels. Panel A 
reports the frequency of the cybersecurity incidents by year, while Panel B 
reports the frequency of the cybersecurity incidents by firm. Moreover, Panel C 
reports the frequency of cybersecurity incidents by breach type. By analysing 
the Panel A, the largest number of incidents in the sample (73) occurred in 2017, 
representing approximately 35%. Moreover, from analysing the Panel A, it is 
evident an increase of the number of incidents over time. In the Panel B, almost 
29% of the firms who were affected by cybersecurity incidents were breached 
more than one time. The companies Bed Bath & Beyond, Intuit and 
InterContinental Hotels reported the highest number of incidents (four). Panel 
C shows that most of the incidents in the sample were due to malicious outsider 
attack (HACK), unintended information disclosure (DISC) and unknown 
factors (UNKN). 
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Table 2 
This Table represents the Frequency Distribution of Cybersecurity Incidents by Year 
(Panel A), by Firm (B) and Type (C ) 
 
Panel A: Cyber-security incidents by Year 
Year    No. of breaches   %  
2015 32 
15,
17 
2016 46 
21,
80 
2017 73 
34,
60 
2018 60 
28,
44 
           Total 211 100 
 
 
Panel B: Cyber-security incidents by Firm 
No. of breaches No. of firms % 
1 121 72,46 
2 31 18,56 
3 12 7,19 
4 3 1,80 
                   Total 167 100 
 
 
Panel C: Cyber-security incidents by Type 
Type No. of breaches Percentage No. of firms Percentage 
DISC 31 14,69 20 12,74 
HACK 101 47,87 75 47,77 
INSD 5 2,37 3 1,91 
PHYS 5 2,37 2 1,27 
PORT 4 1,90 3 1,91 
UNKN 61 28,91 50 31,85 
Missing values 4 1,90 4 2,55 
            Total 211 100 157 100  
 
Table 3 reports the Pearson correlation among the variables used in the 
analysis. Starting with variable BREACH, the correlation with audit fees (LAF) 
is positive and significant which means that when there is a breach, audit fees 
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should increase. Consistent with prior studies, the variables company size 
(LTA), company liabilities (LEV), current assets (CUR), company earnings 
(ROA), company complexity (BUSSEG) and internal controls (ICWEAK) are 
significant correlated with audit fees. Besides that, if we look at the dummy 
BREACH, this variable confirms our hypothesis (H1) given that it results to be 
positively related to LAF (audit fees).  
Insert Table 3 here 
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Table 3 
This table reports the Pearson correlation coefficients among the main variables adopted in the empirical analysis. All 
variables are defined in Appendix B ***, **, * denote significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
 
1.000
0.086 ** 1.000
0.825 ** 0.086 ** 1.000
-0.067 ** -0.002 -0.145 ** 1.000
-0.349 ** -0.028 ** -0.545 ** 0.074 ** 1.000
-0.132 ** -0.011 -0.133 ** -0.033 ** 0.203 ** 1.000
0.166 ** 0.011 0.263 ** -0.692 ** -0.125 ** -0.004 1.000
0.226 ** 0.017 * 0.331 ** -0.001 -0.440 ** -0.326 ** 0.046 ** 1.000
-0.013 0.030 ** -0.018 * 0.003 0.086 ** -0.025 ** 0.022 ** -0.096 ** 1.000
0.403 ** 0.016 * 0.433 ** -0.034 ** -0.283 ** -0.149 ** 0.092 ** 0.173 ** 0.039 ** 1.000
-0.453 ** -0.032 ** -0.543 ** 0.069 ** 0.259 ** 0.086 ** -0.142 ** -0.088 ** -0.048 ** -0.263 ** 1.000
0.541 ** 0.021 ** 0.480 ** -0.055 ** -0.167 ** -0.041 ** 0.098 ** 0.123 ** -0.067 ** 0.136 ** -0.286 ** 1.000
0.251 ** 0.036 ** 0.229 ** -0.016 * -0.096 ** -0.023 ** 0.035 ** 0.047 ** -0.011 0.072 ** -0.114 ** 0.315 ** 1.000
-0.181 ** -0.016 -0.131 ** -0.008 0.049 ** 0.015 ** -0.026 ** -0.018 0.001 -0.035 ** 0.089 ** -0.182 ** -0.049 ** 1.000
INDUSTRY_SPECIALIST AUDITOR_CHANGE
Pearson Correlation Coefficients between Variables
LOG_DEBTEQ YE BUSSEG ICWEAK BIG
AUDITOR_CHANGE
INDUSTRY_SPECIALIST
QUICKVariables LAF BREACH LTA LEV CUR
BREACH
LTA
LEV
CUR
QUICK
ROA
Log_DEBTEQ
YE
BUSSEG
ICWEAK
ROA
BIG
LAF
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According to Table 4, the first regression based on the full sample (breached 
and not breached companies) is reported across four panels (1,2,3,4). In each 
panel it is adding more control variables in order to study the impact on audit 
fees. The results of the cross-sectional regression analysis demonstrate the 
impact of the cybersecurity incidents on audit fees, therefore the hypothesis of 
the positive relationship between cybersecurity incidents and change in audit 
fees in the year of the breach is verified. Column 1 suggests that in the year of 
the breach, audit fees increase. In fact, the dummy (BREACH) identifies the 
presence of a cybersecurity incidents in a specific year is significant and present 
a positive coefficient by explaining the increase in audit fees. The variables 
BREACH remains statistically significant (p<0.001) and positive across all 
models. 
The auditors charge, on average, 26% higher audit fees to the breached firms 
in the year of the data breach. Therefore, the results allow to confirm the 
hypothesis 1 (H1). Moreover, Column B, demonstrates also an increase in audit 
fees increase when the auditor is a Big4. Additional results can be found in the 
Column C, that demonstrates that when the auditor is an industry specialist, 
audit fees are higher, this variable is positive and significant. The fourth panel, 
Column D shows that in presence of an AUDITOR CHANGE audit fees 
decrease, which are also in line with prior studies (Simon and Francis, 1988). 
The Column E includes both INDUSTRY SPECIALIST and AUDITOR 
CHANGE. This means that even if it was controlled for industry specialist, big4 
or auditor change, the variable BREACH remains positive and significant 
demonstrating that in the year of the incident, audit fees increase. Controls 
variables audit effort (LTA), audit risk (LEV and CUR) and auditee’s complexity 
(BUSEEG), have a positive impact on audit fees. If the variable natural 
logarithm of total assets is positive and significant to audit fees, the complexity 
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of the companies increase, meaning the size of the company and subsequent 
audit fees also increase. Moreover, if the variable business segments (BUSSEG) 
is positive and significant to audit fees, this means that the complexity increases 
as well as the charges implemented. On the other hand, the variables audit risk 
(QUICK, ROA, Log_DEBTEQ) and the variable that reveals that auditees whose 
fiscal years do not end on December 31 (YE) are significant, but have a negative 
coefficient. This means that, for example, on variable QUICK, liabilities are 
higher than the sum of assets and inventory, which means there is more risk. 
Moreover, if ROA is significant but has also a negative coefficient, means that 
the risk is higher to get more operating income assets. 
  
Insert Table 4 here 
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Table 4 
This table presents the results of the regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (1). The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of audit fees (LAF) for all the regressions. All other variables are defined in Appendix A. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. 
 
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
INTERCEPT 9.566 0.000 *** 9.606 0.000 *** 9.611 0.000 *** 9.386 0.000 *** 9.388 0.000 ***
BREACH 0.257 0.003 *** 0.274 0.001 *** 0.276 0.001 *** 0.259 0.002 *** 0.261 0.002 ***
LTA 0.554 0.000 *** 0.493 0.000 *** 0.491 0.000 *** 0.489 0.000 *** 0.488 0.000 ***
LEV 0.018 0.002 *** 0.018 0.001 *** 0.018 0.001 *** 0.049 0.000 *** 0.049 0.000 ***
CUR 1.081 0.000 *** 0.999 0.000 *** 0.999 0.000 *** 0.993 0.000 *** 0.994 0.000 ***
QUICK -0.032 0.000 *** -0.034 0.000 *** -0.034 0.000 *** -0.032 0.000 *** -0.032 0.000 ***
ROA -0.021 0.000 *** -0.018 0.000 *** -0.018 0.000 *** -0.015 0.001 *** -0.015 0.001 ***
LOG_DEBTEQ -0.009 0.019 ** -0.008 0.036 ** -0.008 0.042 ** -0.006 0.136 -0.006 0.150
YE -0.092 0.000 *** -0.070 0.000 *** -0.070 0.000 *** -0.071 0.000 *** -0.071 0.000 ***
BUSSEG 0.058 0.000 *** 0.064 0.000 *** 0.064 0.000 *** 0.067 0.000 *** 0.067 0.000 ***
ICWEAK -0.038 0.036 ** 0.012 0.487 0.012 0.502 0.015 0.442 0.014 0.462
BIG 0.531 0.000 *** 0.515 0.000 *** 0.526 0.000 *** 0.511 0.000 ***
INDUSTRY_SPECIALIST 0.059 0.000 *** 0.054 0.002 ***
AUDITOR_CHANGE -0.288 0.000 *** -0.2869 0.000 ***
Industry fixed-effect 0.002 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 0.001 0.000 *** 0.002 0.000 *** 0.002 0.000 ***
Year fixed-effect
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Regression Results: Effect of Cyber-Security Incidents on Audit Fees - Full Sample (breached and not breached companies)
Yes
0.724
0.723
Yes
0.745
0.744
(5)
Yes
0.742
0.742
Yes
0.745
0.745
Yes
0.742
0.741
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Table 5 reports the results of the second model needed to test the second 
hypothesis. First, in Column 1, the variable POST breach is strongly positive 
and significant which explains that audit fees increase in the year and after the 
cybersecurity event despite but the dummy INDUSTRY SPECIALIST is not 
significant. However, in the Column 2, it has been examined the interaction 
term between POST x INDUSTRY SPECIALIST. In this case, the interaction is 
not statistically significant therefore we cannot demonstrate that in presence of 
an industry specialist and in the year and after the incidents the audit fees 
increase. Therefore the Hypothesis 2 is not confirmed. 
 
Insert Table 5 here 
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Table 5 
This table presents the results of the regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (1). The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of audit fees (LAF) for all the regressions. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
 
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
INTERCEPT 10.759 0.000 *** 10.767 0.000 ***
LTA 0.490 0.000 *** 0.490 0.000 ***
LEV -0.028 0.935 -0.035 0.919
CUR 0.498 0.021 ** 0.498 0.021 **
QUICK 0.025 0.328 0.025 0.327
ROA -1.096 0.009 *** -1.086 0.010 **
LOG_DEBTEQ 0.043 0.043 ** 0.042 0.045 **
YE -0.111 0.066 * -0.111 0.067 **
BUSSEG 0.106 0.000 *** 0.107 0.000 ***
ICWEAK 0.258 0.006 *** 0.258 0.006 ***
BIG 0.137 0.298 0.138 0.296
INDUSTRY_SPECIALIST 0.012 0.833 0.023 0.740
POST 0.237 0.001 *** 0.247 0.002 ***
POST_AUDITOR_LEADER -0.036 0.771
Industry fixed-effect -0.005 0.002 *** -0.005 0.002 ***
Year fixed-effect
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
(H2A) (H2B)
Regression Results: Effect of Cyber-Security Incidents on Audit Fees - Breached Firms 
0.768 0.768
0.779 0.779
Yes Yes
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Table 6, reports the results of the last model (3) needed to test the hypothesis 
of the changes in audit fees post-cybersecurity data breach when there is a 
change in auditor. The variable POST reported in Column 1 is positive and 
statistically significant which means that in the year and “post” breach the audit 
fees increase. The Column 2 includes the interaction term POST x AUDITOR 
CHANGE, the coefficient is positive and statistically significant, therefore post 
event and with the change in auditor audit fees increase. This means that new 
auditor face more audit risk and increase the audit fees. 
 
Insert Table 6 here 
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Table 6 
This table presents the results of the regression analysis for the model presented in Equation (1). The dependent variable is the 
natural logarithm of audit fees (LAF) for all the regressions. All other variables are defined in Appendix B. ***, **, * denote 
significance at 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.  
 
Variables Coeff. p-value Coeff. p-value
INTERCEPT 10.540 0.000 *** 10.490 0.000 ***
LTA 0.490 0.000 *** 0.487 0.000 ***
LEV -0.013 0.969 -0.025 0.939
CUR 0.483 0.021 ** 0.497 0.017 **
QUICK 0.026 0.283 0.025 0.306
ROA -1.054 0.011 ** -1.049 0.011 **
LOG_DEBTEQ 0.044 0.037 ** 0.043 0.041 **
YE -0.109 0.074 * -0.108 0.075 *
BUSSEG 0.106 0.000 *** 0.107 0.000 ***
ICWEAK 0.260 0.006 *** 0.261 0.006 ***
BIG 0.135 0.306 0.186 0.164
AUDITOR_CHANGE -0.131 0.488 -0.262 0.192
POST 0.230 0.002 *** 0.221 0.002 ***
POST_AUDITOR_CHANGE 1.062 0.060 *
Industry fixed-effect -0.005 0.002 *** -0.005 0.002 ***
Year fixed-effect
R-squared
Adj. R-squared
Panel A (H3A) Panel B (H3B)
0.769 0.770
Regression Results: Effect of Cyber-Security Incidents on Audit Fees - Breached Firms
Yes Yes
0.779 0.780
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6. Conclusion and Limitations 
This paper addressed the question of how risk factors are disclosure in 
annual reports. Auditors have a key role in this development, they integrate the 
risks in of cybersecurity incidents in the audit fees. In this sense, the audit fees 
can be considered as a proxy to audit effort, audit risk and audit behaviour in 
the year and after the cybersecurity incidents. Basically, this paper approaches 
three questions. The first one investigates if the firms who have suffered a 
cybersecurity incident are charged with higher audit fees in the year of the 
breach, a positive and statistically significant relation between the increase in 
audit fees and the year of the breach has been found. The second one whether 
auditors are aware of the potential security issues before an incident occurs or if 
they revise their risk assessment following a cybersecurity breach, in other 
words if how an auditor that is industry specialist behave pre-post the 
cybersecurity events, this hypothesis is not demonstrated. The third result is 
related to the investigation weather the audit fees increase in the post-event and 
with the change in auditor. Differently from results of a prior study (Simon and 
Francis, 1988) that demonstrate a decrease in audit fees related with the change 
in auditor, after the breach and with an auditor changes, the fees increase. 
Generally, the results obtained suggest that cybersecurity risk is positively 
associated with audit fees. This idea can be simply explained by the supposition 
where cybersecurity incidents and the subsequent perceived vulnerability of a 
firm towards these incidents result in higher risk of material misstatement, like 
audit risk. For that reason, audit firms increase their effort to ensure the 
endurance of their clients and reduce the risk from the disclosure of annual 
reports. This increase in audit risk and efforts lead to an increase in audit fees. 
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The empirical analysis provides more insights about the amount that 
auditors charge, on average, 26 percent higher audit fees to breached firms in 
the year when a cybersecurity incident occurs. Secondly, when there is an 
increase in audit fees on average of 53 percent when the auditor is a Big4.   
The results obtained in thesis provide a little contribution in the research area 
of audit and cybersecurity. More than that, this study goes a long way in 
explaining empirical evidence on the effectiveness of auditing guidelines and 
risk assessment procedures, which can be interesting to regulators and 
practitioners.   
About limitations, there is a possibility to go further in terms of studying the 
true effort and audit risk through another perceived vulnerabilities. 
Furthermore, according to Higgs et al. (2016), the database PRC does not 
incorporate the entire population of breaches. Alongside to this idea, this study 
is limited to US publicity traded firms and in the context of changes to the 
European Data Protection implementation; an international study in this area 
can be useful.  
Despite of our study suggest that auditors incorporate cybersecurity risk into 
their audit risk model, the data does not provide insights into how and what 
extent is done. According to previous studies like Asare & Wright (2004), expert 
consultation, Low (2004), auditor specialization, Knapp & Knapp (2001), 
formalized instructions, they result in better audit risk assessment. 
Experimental or interview based studies might shed light on the tools and 
techniques that auditors adopt when considering client specific cybersecurity 
risk and the method for incorporating such risk into audit fees. 
The question concerning how auditors are able to accurately assess 
cybersecurity risks is still an open question for future research. Internal data 
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provided by auditors or experimental study designs may be able to provide 
further insights in this respect.  
In conclusion, there is still space for future research to examine how auditors 
perceived IT outsourcing or the use of cloud computing or other cybersecurity 
strategies that could contain both the company and audit risks.  
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Appendix A7 
This appendix presents a table where a definition in example cases regarding the different 
types of cybersecurity incidents are classify and reported, according to the Database Privacy 
Rights Clearinghouse. 
 
Type Definition Example 
CARD Payment card fraud. Company's Name: McFadden. 
Disclosure Date: January 6, 2016. 
No. Records Breached: Unknown. 
Brief Description: McFadden's costumers 
received phone calls about fraudulent charges 
made to their credit card, concerning the use of 
a fake one. 
DISC 
Unintended information 
disclosure. 
Company's Name: DXC Technology. 
Disclosure Date: July 5, 2017. 
No. Records Breached: Unknown. 
Brief Description: An internet hyperlink 
containing patient information was accessible 
between a certain periods of time. The 
information included patient´s names, 
Medicaid ID numbers, names and addresses of 
healthcare providers, patient numbers, 
procedures codes, dates of service, and 
payment amounts. 
HACK Malicious outsider attack. Company's name: Vtech. 
Disclosure Date: November 30, 2015. 
    No. Records Breached: 5,100,000. 
Brief Description: Vtech notified customers of 
a data breach when hackers were able to gain 
access to children's photos, chat logs, 
children's names, genders and birthdates, 
account email addresses, passwords, secret 
questions and answers for password retrieval, 
IP addresses, mailing addresses and download 
history. 
INSD Malicious insider. Company's Name: Anthem. 
    Disclosure Date: July 31, 2017. 
No. Records Breached: 18,500. 
Brief Description: Anthem's had one employee 
who had been involved in a case of identity 
theft, and further investigation discovered that 
the worker had "emailed a file with 
information about Anthem companies' 
members to his personal email address", a year 
ago. In all, more than 18,500 Anthem Medicare 
members' Social Security and Medicare 
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identification data may have been exposed. 
PHYS Physical loss. 
Company's Name: T-Bird Restaurant Group, 
Inc. 
Disclosure Date: September 17, 2015. 
No. Records Breached: Unknown. 
  
Brief Description: The Outback Steakhouse 
notified employees of a data breach when the 
location was burglarized. The individual(s) 
managed to steal computer equipment 
including their point of sale computer terminal 
and back office computer. The point of sale 
computer contained information that included 
employee time sheet information, files that 
contained names and Social Security numbers. 
PORT 
A lost, discarded or stolen 
portable device. 
Company's Name: Humana. 
Disclosure Date: October 9, 2015. 
No. Records Breached: 2,800. 
Brief Description: Humana notified Wisconsin 
members of a breach of customer information 
after an employee's vehicle was broken into 
and a company laptop was stolen along with a 
file containing customer information. The 
information compromised included member 
names, dates of birth, Humana and clinic 
names. The documents also included Humana 
member identification numbers of 250 of those 
individuals. 
STAT Stationary device. Company's Name: Capital Financial Group. 
Disclosure Date: November 11, 2015. 
No. Records Breached: Unknown. 
Brief Description: Capital Financial Group had 
the Cindi Philips' office broken into and two 
computers were stolen. The computers stored 
files which included your personal 
information. The information included your 
name, marital status, employer information, 
net worth, home phone number, E-mail 
address, cell phone number, address, and 
Social Security Number. 
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Appendix B8 
This table provides the definition of the variables included in the analysis and the respective data sources.
 
 
LOG_DEBTEQ
BUSSEG
Variables Source
LAF Audit Analytics - Audit Fees
Definition
Natural logarithm of audit fees.
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
Compustat
LEV
LTA
CUR
QUICK
ROA
Total debt divided by equity book value.
DISC Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
HACK Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 1 if a cyber-security security incident was due to a malicious outsider attack, 0 otherwise.
Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
TREATMENT 1 if a firm belongs to the treatment sample (i.e. breached) used in the DID analysis for the effect of cyber-security incidents on audit fees, 0 otherwise.
CARD Privacy Rights Clearinghouse
Compustat
Compustat
YE
ICWEAK
Natural logarithm of end of year total assets. 
Current liabilities divided by total assets.
Current assets divided by total assets.
Difference between current assets and inventory divided by current liabilities.
Earnings before interest and taxes divided by total assets.
INSD Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 1 if a cyber-security security incident was due to a malicious insider, 0 otherwise.
Natural logarithm of number of business segments. 
1 if a firm’s fiscal year does not end on December 31, 0 otherwise. 
1 if a firm’s disclosure controls were not found to be effective under Section 302 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, 0 otherwise.
1 if a firm has a cyber-security incident in year t, 0 otherwise.
1 if a cyber-security security incident was due to payment cards, 0 otherwise.
1 if a cyber-security security incident was due to unintended information disclosure, 0 otherwise.
BREACH
PHYS Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 1 if a cyber-security security incident was due to unauthorized physical access, 0 otherwise..
PORT Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 1 if a cyber-security security incident was due to lost or missing portable device(s), 0 otherwise.
STAT Privacy Rights Clearinghouse 1 if a cyber-security security incident was due to stationary device(s), 0 otherwise.
POST 1 if a fiscal-year is after a cyber-security incident (Table 10) or after a SEC Comment Letter related to cybersecurity (Table 12), 0 otherwise.
